While the theoretical literature strongly argues in favor of ratchets (anti-dilution protections) and liquidation rights, recent empirical studies documented limits in their use. This paper studies firms' financing constraints in a model of staged venture capital financing where new-money raised and post-money values evolve randomly over time. Our analysis reveals that ventures fail if new money raised is "too small" or "too large"; in the latter case this is despite positive pre-money value. We analyze the conditions under which a venture capitalist will accept modifications of her contract provisions and document quantitatively the relevance of our results.
Introduction
Ratchets (anti-dilution protections) and liquidation rights are common preference rights in US venture capital contracts, but neither are they used in all US financings, nor are they a popular feature internationally, see, e.g. Johan (2006) and de Bettignies (2008) . Despite this empirical evidence, a large body of the theoretical VC literature studies agency problems and concludes that preference rights are optimal contracting provisions 1 . Our paper studies the feasibility of contracting for an entrepreneur and compares the financing constraints she faces with ratchets and liquidation rights.
We introduce a model of staged venture capital, where two different venture capitalists (VCs) provide financing at two subsequent dates. To capture the uncertain prospects of the company across time, both new money raised and the post-money (venture) value evolve randomly over time. Liquidation rights give VCs a minimum return (called multiple) on their invested capital; ratchets protect a VC from dilution when the value of their share decreases from one round to the next. These preference rights are common to most venture contracts, see Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) 2 . Throughout we compare different multiples and study two extreme situations: one where the VC holds no ratchet and one where she holds a full ratchet. In line with the literature, see, e.g., Amit et al. (1989) , and Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) , we assume that VCs invest at zero net present value and use this to derive their stakes. For pricing we use the real-options approach, see, e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1996) , Duffie (2001) , Trigeorgis (1996) .
We prove that, at both dates, either with or without ratchet, a VC can contract only within some interval for new money raised in relation to current post-money value. When the liquidation multiple is larger than the bond return, we show that "small" financings are not be feasible with a multiple; the reason for the failure is that the multiple then pays "too much," i.e. the multiple is "too large". Furthermore we prove that, if the financing gets "too large," contracting also fails.
1 References include, among others, Gompers (1995) , Bergemann and Hege (1998) , Cornelli and Yosha (2003) , and Schmidt (2003) .
2 Sahlman (1990) describes in detail preference rights as control mechanism in Venture Capital: cash-flow rights, staging of capital and syndication. Our focus is on the allocation of risk and return; in addition to the cash-flow rights that we study, dividend preferences are common. However, dividend preferences play a role similar to liquidation preferences; therefore, for simplicity, we only study liquidation preferences.
Clearly, new money raised cannot be larger than the post-money value; however our analysis shows that financing also fails when it is strictly smaller than post-money value. This destruction of positive pre-money value seems counterintuitive, but in staged financings the multiple of either venture capitalist (VC) impacts the other VC in such a way that she cannot recover her invested money if the amount is "too large." Furthermore, we characterize the situations under which the ratchet applies and when it has to be waived. Finally we discuss the interplay between excessive multiple, dilution, ratchet waiver and venture liquidation despite positive pre-money value. We document, among others, when second round post-money value is small compared to the post-money value in the previous round, there is no way to evade liquidation. Also, while multiples are a financing constraint for small financings, for intermediate sizes of financings they help to evade share price dilution and the need to waive ratchets.
One may counter that this failure and the financing constraints they impose are qualitative observations that are quantitatively not relevant. To address this, we illustrate our results in numerical examples using parameters taken from the empirical literature. We then document that the intervals within which VCs contract are fairly small: The company will be liquidated despite positive pre-money value if the new money raised is at roughly 2/3 of post-money value, i.e. if new money is more than twice pre-money value. With a multiple of 3 the minimum financing amount is at 20% of post-money value. We also find up to 90% probability that the company is either liquidated or the multiple reduced, and about 40% conditional probability that the ratchet will be waived when the share price decreases. Finally, we see that the liquidation multiple affects the company stake considerably, but that the ratchet makes no big difference for the first VC.
Our paper is related to the literature that looks at the use of preference rights in VC. While a large body of the literature focused on US venture capital, recent empirical evidence added an international perspective: Lerner and Schoar (2005) , Cumming (2005) , Kaplan et al. (2007) , and Cumming (2008) all found that outside the US preferred equity with ratchets and liquidation rights is not the predominant form of venture capital financing. Addition to this, Gilson and Schizer (2003) have forcefully argued that tax rationales explain the prevalent use of preference rights in US. Despite this, the theoretical literature is dominated by the view that ratchets and liquidation rights are optimal contracting provisions between the entrepreneur and VCs: they come to this conclusion in analysis of the principal agent relationship between entrepreneur and VC (Amit et al. (1989) , Admati and Pfleiderer (1994) , Gompers (1995) , Bergemann and Hege (1998) , and Schmidt (2003) ), of the double moral hazard problem when VC and entrepreneur to provide effort (Hellmann (2006) ), and in analysis of window-dressing by the entrepreneur (Cornelli and Yosha (2003) ).
To our knowledge, financings constraints that stem from these rights have not been studied so far 3 . The advantages of cash-flow rights as incentivization devices have been studied and stressed extensively in the literature so far; however, our paper points out that these preference rights impose severe financing constraints on the venture. First of all, we show that ventures may fail despite positive pre-money value. This matches the concern often voiced that ventures fail despite promising business prospects. While Boyle and Guthrie (2003) attribute this failure to informational asymmetries, we relate it to financing constraints. Venture capital is an important source of financing for entrepreneurs; indirectly, our paper thereby also relates to the literature on the availability of financing for new businesses, see Kerr and Nanda (2009) . Second, our paper shows that new financings need to involve considerable amounts of money relative to post-money value; this restricts the amount of money to be raised. While it is often said that small amounts of money are too costly to be raised from VCs we point out, that this is due to the liquidation preferences in venture capital contracts and not necessarily a feature of venture financings itself. Finally, we stress the importance of adjusting contract provisions, i.e. waiving ratchets or reducing multiples.
The remainder is organized as follows: the next section presents our three-date setup. Section 3 looks at date 2 events, including the decision problem of a new VC coming in and the effect of any ratchet on contracting; section 4 then looks at the date 1 decision problem of the initial VC. Section 5 concludes the paper. All proofs are postponed to the appendix.
3 Our paper is related to the valuation of ratchets and liquidation rights, but this problem has been ignored in the literature with the exception of the continuous-time analysis of Cossin et al. (2002) .
Model
Detailed overviews of the VC Market are available, e.g., in Fenn et al. (1995) , Gompers and Lerner (1999) , Sahlman et al. (1999) and Metrick (2007) . Ratchets and liquidation preferences are discussed in detail, e.g., in chapter 9 of Metrick (2007) and in chapter 13 of Bagley and Dauchy (2002) . This section introduces our model of VC financings over two rounds with ratchets and liquidation rights.
Events
A new venture typically requires many financing rounds, but for simplicity we assume that there are exactly two. We look at a new venture company that has been founded by an entrepreneur at date 0; the founder holds all its equity until date 1. At dates 1 and 2 the venture requires new financing from a VC; at the final date 3 the company is liquidated either through a sale, an IPO or a liquidation of assets. To keep notation simple, we assume that in each financing round exactly one VC enters and that the VC in the second round is different from the VC of the first round.
At date 1 the entrepreneur raises capital in the amount N 1 > 0 from the first VC by issuing new shares to the VC; we denote the stake 4 of the entrepreneur (first VC) after the financing by α 0 (α 1 ). At date 2 the company requires additional financing in the amount N 2 > 0. If the second VC provides financing, we denote α 2 the company stake she contracts; the company stakes of the entrepreneur (VC) will be adjusted to α a 0 (α a 1 ). We derive a notion of fair contracting from fair pricing: at date 2, conditional on P 2 , N 2 , we first determine the value V 2 (α 2 ) as a function of the second VC's stake α 2 ; we then choose α 2 as the one for which the investment is priced fairly, i.e. V 2 (α 2 ) = N 2 . Similarly, we determine the date 1 value V 1 (α 1 ) of the first VC's ownership; fair contracting means that we look for α 1 with N 1 = V 1 (α 1 ). Note that the date 1 value function will have to take account of the date 2 dilution in ownership, any ratchets and any liquidation preference of the second VC. If a VC requires a stake larger than 100%, the financing fails and the company will be liquidated. If the ownership required is negative, we assume that contract specifications will be adjusted by the VC. If the company has not been liquidated before date 3, it will be liquidated at this date and all remaining values paid out to the parties according to their liquidation preferences. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of events.
Preference Rights
Liquidation preferences are expressed as a multiple of invested money with a typical multiple of 1, 2 or 3, see, e.g., the quarterly Fenwick and West (2010) market surveys. We denote M 1 ≥ 1 and M 2 ≥ 1 the multiples of the first and second VC, respectively. For simplicity of exposition we only look at participating liquidation preferences, i.e. after holders of preferred stock receive their full liquidation preference, they then also share with the other shareholders (in particular with the entrepreneur holding common stock) in the remaining amounts. Furthermore, we assume that the second VC gets senior liquidation preference over the first VC, i. To analyze the ratchet we need to study the number of shares issued and, only for this purpose, we assume throughout the remainder of this subsection that the entrepreneur holds one share (before date 1 and thereafter); this assumption will neither affect the relative share price changes over time, nor any party's stakes. We denote S 1 and S 2 the number of shares the first and second VC contract at date 1, respectively. (Note that α 1 = S 1 /(1 + S 1 ) gives the stake the first VC contracts at date 1.) Share prices are based on new money raised and new shares issued in any financing round, i.e. they are
Let us look at date 2 and assume that the post-money value is P 2 and new money raised is N 2 .
The fair contracting stake for the second VC from date 2 forward fulfills
under the assumption that the ratchet will not take effect. This translates into
When this share price is not lower than the date 1 share price (p 2 ≥ p 1 ), the second VC will know that the ratchet does not take effect and accept S 2 shares in exchange for N 2 . Because the second VC wants to contract α 2 , the first VC's stake will be reduced by issuing new shares.
The stake was α 1 between dates 1 and 2; after the financing, the first VC's stake is α 1 of the "remaining" company, i.e.
If the share price p 2 is lower than p 1 , and the first VC holds a full ratchet, then the ratchet applies. She receives as many additional shares that she holds S a 1 in total afterwards 6 , where 5 There are other ways to adjust the number of shares, including the so-called weighted-average ratchet. In this paper we only study the two extremes, either that the second VC has no ratchet or that shes has a full ratchet.
6 In practice a conversion ratio is introduced that determines the ratio by which preferred shares convert into common shares. This ratio is adjusted by the anti-dilution protection. However, to simplify our presentation throughout this paper we think of all shares on a so-called "fully converted basis,"such that the effect of the anti-dilution protection is to issue additional shares to old VCs. Note that the liquidation preference of a VC is based on the total capital invested and will not be affected by adjustments in the number of shares.
this new number of shares of the first VC is set in such a way that the (fictitious) date 1 price
However, there is a "second round effect" to this: the second VC will anticipate that the first VC will hold more shares and that her company stake reduced below α 2 if she contracts S 2 shares. To counter this from the start, she will ask for as many shares S a 2 such that, taking account of the ratchet, she holds exactly the company share α 2 afterwards, i.e.
Then the first VC will hold the stake
Values
We denote the (physical) time between dates 1 and 3 by T ; for simplicity of exposition we assume that the second financing date 2 is halfway between the first financing date 1 and the final date 3, i.e. at (physical) time T /2 from each. Over time, the so-called post-money value of the company and the new money raised are bivariate lognormal distributed 7 , i.e. for dates i = 1, 2:
Each of the pairs (Z 7 Cochrane (2005) reports that the distribution of post-money values is close to a lognormal. To our knowledge the distribution of post-money values and new money raised has not been analyzed, yet. Our choice is made for convenience.
At any date, when the company is liquidated, the liquidation value will be distributed to all shareholders according to their cash flow (liquidation preference) rights. (The entrepreneur receives the entire date 1 liquidation value; we will neither model nor discuss it, because we are interested in the impact of the VC's contracting terms on the feasibility of financing.) We assume that the date 2 liquidation value L(P 2 , N 2 ) is a (typically fairly small) fraction λ of the date 1 post-money value P 1 , i.e. L(P 2 , N 2 ) = λP 1 . The idea is that, in case of liquidation, investors will recover some fraction of the initial value. At date 3 we assume that the liquidation value is given by the date 3 post-money value P 3 .
Both value functions V 1 , V 2 require the valuation of future contingent payoffs. For this we use the risk-neutral (real options) approach, i.e. we denote the constant (continuously-compounded) interest rate by r and redefine the instantaneous mean of P and N to be equal to the risk-free bond return for the time-horizon of interest and K the strike price of the option. The parameters r, σ P , T/2 refer to the interest rate, the volatility of post-money values and the physical time between the valuation date and maturity of the option. They are fixed; therefore we write BS(P 2 , K) for simplicity throughout this paper.
The Investment Problem for the Second VC
This section studies how the second VC contracts at date 2. She observes the post-money value P 2 and is asked to provide financing in the amount N 2 ; throughout this section, our analysis is conditional on these values, but to keep notation simple we usually drop dependence.
If the second VC refuses financing at date 2, the company is liquidated and all assets distributed according to the liquidation preference of the first VC. The resulting payouts to the entrepreneur and the first VC will be studied later in subsection 4.1 when we look at the date 1 investment problem of the first VC. If the second VC provides financing, the company stakes of 
The Second VC's Stake
If the second VC invests she has seniority over the first VC at date 3, i.e. she will be paid before any other party until she received a multiple M 2 N 2 of her date 2 investment N 2 . (The value to be paid out is the date 3 liquidation value P 3 .) After the second VC has received her multiple, the first VC will be next in line and be paid up to a multiple M 1 N 1 of her date 1 investment N 1 .
Finally, after the two VCs received their multiples, any remainder is distributed pro-rata among the two VCs and the entrepreneur. Figure 2 depicts the payout profiles as a function of date 3 post-money value.
The payout of the second VC can be interpreted as a portfolio of call options (with maturity at date 3) and the (so-called) "underlying security," her the date 3 venture value: one unit in the venture, −1 unit in the call option with strike M 2 N 2 and α 2 (P 2 , N 2 ) units in the call option with strike M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 . Then the value V 2 of the second VC's claim can be calculated and expressed using the Black-Scholes formula:
Fair contracting requires that the value of the second VC's stake of the company equals N 2 ; it gives us her stake: Note that zero financings are not economically meaningful; here we study them only as limiting cases. Proposition 1 implies that for M 2 ≤ exp(rT /2) the stake α 2 is always positive while for M 2 > exp(rT /2) it gets negative initially. For given post-money value P 2 figure 3 illustrates the shape of α 2 as a function of 0 ≤ N 2 ≤ P 2 for both cases M 2 > exp(rT /2) (dashed line) and M 2 ≤ exp(rT /2) (solid line). (The different cutoffs and intervals will be introduced in the next subsection.) For later reference we note that proposition 1 directly implies: Although we do not make this explicit, note that cutoffs depend on date 2 post-money value P 2 and multiple M 2 . For M 2 > exp(rT /2) and given date 2 post-money value P 2 , figure 3 illustrates both cutoffs: If new money N 2 is below the multiple cutoffN m 2 , stakes α 2 are negative; the liquidation cutoffN l 2 is smaller than the post-money value P 2 and for asset values in between the stake is larger than 100%. Note that when M 2 is smaller than or equal to exp(rT /2) the function is always positive and so there is only a liquidation but no multiple reduction cutoff.
The next subsection analyzes separately stakes α 2 that are negative and those larger than 1.
Destructive Liquidation and Multiple Reduction
When new money N 2 is larger than the post-money value P 2 (which includes the new money), the pre-money value is negative; no investor will provide financing and the company be liquidated. Therefore, proposition 1 looks only at new financings that do not exceed P 2 . It states that the company will be liquidated for all financings between the liquidation cutoff and the post-money value: for these the company stake α 2 is larger than 100% even when N 2 is less than P 2 , i.e.
even if pre-money value P 2 − N 2 is strictly positive. This destroys the positive pre-money value and therefore we refer to this as destructive liquidation.
At first, destructive liquidation may seem counterintuitive. To see it makes sense, let us look at figure 2 and assume that N 2 is close to P 2 . We know that the date 3 venture liquidation payoff profile is linear with slope 1, intercept 0 and that this payoff profile has value P 2 . However, the payoff profile for the second agent initially has slope 1 and intercept 0, but from M 2 N 2 onwards it remains flat and only picks up with the participation. For fair contracting, the payout profile of the second agent needs to have a value equal to N 2 . Therefore, the participation needs to have slope larger than 100% to make up for the flat payout profile between M 2 N 2 and M 2 N 2 + M 1 N 1 .
The underlying economic reason for destructive liquidation is therefore the preferential treatment that the previous VC receives through her multiple: before any other party, in particular before the entrepreneur, she receives (a multiple of) her invested money. Here, the payout profile for the second VC is flat between M 2 N 2 and M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 , and so she needs to recover the remainder from her participation, asking for more than 100% company stake. We want to stress that seniority of the second VC is not the source of destructive liquidation: if the first VC would have seniority over the second, the payoff profile would also be flat over some interval. Figure 3 illustrates the destructive liquidation cutoff for multiples M 2 > exp(rT /2): for smaller (larger) financings the stake α 2 is smaller (larger) than 100%. (The cutoff depends on the multiple; we do not depict it for multiple M 2 ≤ exp(rT /2).)
Proposition 3 states that outside destructive liquidation the stake α 2 decreases as we increase the multiple M 2 . Figure 3 illustrates that below the horizontal 100% line the solid line for multiples M 2 ≤ exp(rT /2) is always above the dashed line for multiples M 2 > exp(rT /2), i.e. that the liquidation cutoff increases with the multiple M 2 . In consequence, proposition 3 states also that the first derivative of destructive liquidation cutoff w.r.t. the multiple is positive.
If a new financing is so large that destructive liquidation is inevitable, a larger multiple moves the liquidation cutoff to the right (proposition 3). However, the liquidation cutoff is always below the post-money value (proposition 2) and it remains unclear if this can always remedy liquidation.
We do not pursue this avenue further here.
So far we studied in this subsection stakes larger than 100% and discussed destructive liquidation. Next we want to study negative stakes α 2 . The economic reason for this is the following:
When N 2 is "small" compared to P 2 , it is likely that the date 3 value P 3 is large enough to pay the multiple M 2 N 2 in full and on top the participation α 2 · max{(
Intuitively, the multiple ensures a return that is too large when new money raised is small. To price the value of the second VC's claim fairly at value N 2 , the participation needs to reduce her payout, i.e. α 2 must be negative. Proposition 1 states that this situation comes up whenever
When new money raised is then less than the cutoff value, the second VC requires a negative stake α 2 and the financing fails. Based on proposition 1 we know that negative stakes do not show up when M 2 = 1. To remedy the situation so that the second VC can invest and the company is not liquidated, we assume the second VC then reduces her multiple to M 2 = 1.
Therefore we refer to this situation as multiple reduction.
with the property that for all 0 < P 2 <P 2 (γ):
Note thatγ andP 2 depend on N 1 , M 1 , M 2 , but we do not make this dependence explicit to simplify our presentation. Previously our analysis fixed post-money value P 2 and varied new money raised between 0 and P 2 . Here we take a different look: we vary P 2 and study N 2 = γP 2 for all γ and P 2 below suitably chosen valuesγ andP 2 . This proposition permits us to get further insights into destructive liquidation and multiple reduction for "small" date 2 post-money values P 2 in relation to the date 1 post-money value P 1 = 1. For M 2 < exp(rT /2) and all sufficiently small γ, proposition 4 (together with propositions 1, 2) states that for P 2 → 0 destructive liquidation occurs for N 2 /P 2 ≥ γ, i.e. destructive liquidation makes up an increasing fraction of the interval 0 to P 2 . It also means that the cutoff
Recall that we set P 1 = 1; therefore P 2 → 0 means that date 2 post-money value in relation to date 1 post-money value P 1 tends to 0. Our interpretation of the previous result is therefore that, it gets harder to evade destructive liquidation, if the venture's date 2 post-money value P 2 gets smaller in comparison to the previous date 1 post-money value
Similarly, for M 2 > exp(rT /2), proposition 4 implies thatN m 2 /P 2 → 0 as P 2 → 0. This means that as the date 2 post-money value P 2 (in relation to date 1 post-money value P 1 ) gets smaller it gets harder to evade negative stakes α 2 . This proposition will play a role below when we look at negative stakes and in particular in subsection 3.4 when we study combinations of post-money value and new money.
Proposition 4 points to an interesting interplay of multiple reduction with destructive liquidation. When M 2 > exp(rT /2) the proposition states that for sufficiently small P 2 (in relation to date 1 post-money value P 1 = 1) multiple reduction leads to liquidation: if both γ and P 2 are sufficiently small then reducing the multiple M 2 to one, the stake α 2 gets larger than 100% and consequently the company will be liquidated. (Put loosely, this situation comes up when N 2 < P 2 and both values are close to 0.) In this situation there is no way to chose a multiple that permits financing and the company has to be liquidated. We will illustrate this in subsection 3.4.
Share Price Dilution
When the date 2 share price is lower than the date 1 share price we have a so-called down round, This proposition tells us, when the share price is diluted for some N 2 , it will also be for all larger financings. To characterize it in further analysis, we use the cutoffN d 2 . A consequence of the proposition is also that there can be a down-round only for sufficiently large N 2 . Because the dilution cutoff increases, there are intermediate sizes of financings, where a smaller multiple would lead to share price dilution but larger multiples evade dilution.
We described in subsection 2.2 the company stake α a 1 the first VC holds after the second VC provided money. With ratchet, when the required total company stake α a 1 + α 2 of both VCs together is larger than 100%, contracting is impossible. To remedy the situation we then assume that the first VC waives his ratchet; otherwise the second VC would not invest and the company would have to be liquidated. Without ratchet, the company will be financed unless destructive liquidation and/or multiple reduction make it impossible, see our earlier discussion.
The following provides further insights when the ratchet will be waived:
Proposition 6 Assume a fixed P 2 > 0. If the share price is diluted and the ratchet waived for some N 2 with 0 < α 2 (P 2 , N 2 ) < 1, then there exists a cutoffN w 2 such that the share price price is diluted and the ratchet waived for allN This proposition tells us that the dilution intervalN
2 that we noted in proposition 5 is subdivided into two intervals, one where the ratchet is waived and one where it is not.
Furthermore, it tells us that the ratchet is waived only for sufficiently large new financings.
Finally note that proposition 5 tells us that the dilution cutoff increases with increasing multiple, while proposition 6 tells us that the ratchet waiver cutoff decreases. We conclude that increasing the multiple, the interval where the ratchet is waived takes up an ever larger portion of the dilution interval, becauseN
We will illustrate and discuss this further in the next subsection.
Interplay of Destructive Liquidation, Multiple Reduction, Dilution and Ratchet Waived
Our analysis of the previous subsections showed that, at date 2, four special events can happen:
the multiple of the second agent may be reduced, the company may be liquidated, the share price may decrease such that the ratchet would apply (price "dilution") and the first VC may waive her ratchet if applicable. This subsection discusses how these four events interplay; for this we study combinations of post-money value P 2 and new money raised N . Our analysis looks first at the situation where the second VC's multiple M 2 < exp(rT /2), i.e. when the multiple never has to be reduced; we then study in a second step how the insights carry over to the situation where the multiple may have to be reduced, i.e. when M 2 > exp(rT /2). When the multiple M 2 < exp(rT /2), it never has to be reduced; so only three events can happen: the company may be liquidated, the share price may decrease such that the ratchet would apply (price "dilution") and the first VC may waive her ratchet if applicable. For combinations of post-money value P 2 and new money raised N 2 figure 4 shows the different areas where these events interplay. For completeness we show there the area above the 45 degree line where we have N 2 > P 2 , i.e. negative pre-money and the company will be liquidated. However, this area has not been and will not be the object of our study: Below the 45 degree line pre-money is positive and this is the area we are interested in.
With the exception of proposition 4 we always looked at fixed post-money value P 2 and varied N 2 ; graphically within figure 4, this means that we previously looked at vertical lines for every possible date 2 post-money value P 2 . All the cutoffs that we introduced before appear as points on these vertical lines. Varying P 2 , the cutoffs define the areas that we see in figure   4 : on any vertical line we see that directly below the 45 degree line is destructive liquidation, where the company is liquidated despite positive pre-money (proposition 2); propositions 5 and 6 state that area with dilution but ratchet waiver is directly below the destructive liquidation and above an area with dilution but without ratchet waiver; below all other areas is where we Finally, we study the situation when the second VC's multiple M 2 > exp(rT /2). We know from propositions 1 and 2 that for any given post-money value P 2 , there is a multiple cutoff and we need to reduce the multiple for smaller financings. The dotted area in figure 5 refers to those combinations of post-money value and new money where the multiple must be reduced; here we reduce it to one and inside the dotted area we are back to figure 4. Inside, the events are ordered exactly as there: we see an area where the share price decreases ("dilution") which is further subdivided into one where the ratchet has to be waived by the first VC to permit contracting.
There is also the region of figure 4 where the company needs to be liquidated, according to proposition 4 and our discussion thereafter.
Outside the dotted area but below the 45 degree line the mutiple is larger than inside the dotted area. There, the areas are ordered in the same way as in figure 4 , in general. However, the lines that separate destructive liquidation, dilution and ratchet waiver do not have smooth continuations between the dotted and the non-dotted area. The origin of this is that for any P 2 value, we know from propositions 3, 5 and 6 that the liquidation and dilution cutoffs show is "too small" compared to post-money value to support a given multiple M 2 > exp(rT /2), we need to reduce it but then destructive liquidation, dilution and ratchet waived will all apply at much lower values N 2 .)
In the lower left part we depict an odd situation which we pointed out after proposition 5: if the size of date 2 post-money value P 2 in relation to date 1 post-money value P 1 is "small," then there is no financing at all. If the multiple M 2 > exp(rT /2) then the company will be either liquidated because of destructive liquidation with the given multiple, or the multiple will have to reduced and then there is destructive liquidation. (This follows from proposition 4: the line separating the multiple reduction area approximates the destructive liquidation line smoothly, as depicted. We noted earlier with multiple M 2 < exp(rT /2) that the line separating the destructive liquidation region approximates the P 2 axis smoothly, also as depicted.)
If the size of post-money value P 2 is intermediate, the following interesting interplay between our four events arises as we vary the amount of new financing N 1 from zero to P 2 . Near zero, the multiple needs to be reduced; as we increase it we encounter dilution without ratchet waiver, then dilution with ratchet waiver; once N 2 is sufficiently large that the multiple does not have to be reduced any more, the second VC contracts as is; however, as we further increase N 2 we encounter again dilution, first without ratchet waiver and then with waiver; ultimately we run into destructive liquidation.
The Investment Problem for the First VC
At date 1, the first VC will contract the company stake α 1 for her investment N 1 , to be held between dates 1 and 2. She needs to take account of the optimal date 2 actions of the second VC, i.e. either the company will be liquidated or her fractional ownership will be adjusted to α a 1 at date 2. We look separately at the case where the first VC has no ratchet (anti-dilution protection) and the case where she holds the so-called full ratchet.
Date 2 Values of the First VC's Claims
If the second VC refuses financing at date 2, the company is liquidated and the liquidation value L(P 2 , N 2 ) = λP 1 distributed among the entrepreneur and the first VC according to the liquidation preference. The first VC will then receive a multiple M 1 of her initial investment N 1 , i.e. before anything goes to the entrepreneur, the first VC receives all distributions until she has received M 1 N 1 ; any remaining values are distributed pro-rata according to their company stakes α 0 , α 1 that have been contracted at date 0. Figure 6 plots the resulting payoff profile. In our later analysis, the first VC's payout plays an important role; for later reference we denote her If the company is not liquidated at date 2, the second VC invests N 2 in exchange for a stake α 2 in the company according to equation (6). (The multiple will be M 2 = M 1 , but may be reduced to M 2 = 1, see our earlier discussion in subsection 3.1.) The stake α a 1 that the first VC holds between dates 2 and 3 is then given by equations (2, 3) depending on whether the ratchet applies or not. The date 2 claim of the first VC is then a portfolio of calls, see figure 2, with value
The First VC's Date 1 Stake Without Ratchet
This subsection assumes the first VC does not hold a ratchet (anti-dilution protection). According to equation (2), the first VC's stake α a 1 between dates 2 and 3 will be the fraction α 1 of the remainder of the second VC's stake, i.e. α a 1 = α 1 (1 − α 2 ). She anticipates this reduction when setting her date 1 stake in the venture; we will now analyze how she contracts.
Further analysis in this subsection needs to distinguish the events when the second VC does and when she does not provide financing; for this we introduce two indicator variables on mutually exclusive events: I fin (I liq ) takes the value 1 (0) when the company is financed, and 0 (1) otherwise, i.e. when it is liquidated. Based on our analysis in the previous subsection the date 1 value of the first VC's investment as a function of the stake α 1 is:
For fair contracting we require N 1 = V 1 (α 1 ), which gives
Here the discounted expectation in the numerator is the date 1 value of the payouts to the first VC without the date 3 participation: the term L VC (P 2 , N 2 ) describes the payoff for the first VC if it is liquidated at date 2; when the company is financed (not liquidated), As before, we study zero financings only as limiting cases. Note that the multiple and liquidation cutoffs depend on M 1 . Proposition 7 gives date 1 results for the first VC that are similar to those about the date 2 multiple and liquidation cutoffs in propositions 1 and 2 for the second VC; the difference is that before the shape depended on the distinction of multiples being larger/smaller than exp(rT /2) while here it depends on the distinction of multiples being larger/smaller than the ratio of exp(rT /2) to the probability of date 2 financing, Prob [financing] . Figure 7 illustrates the shape of α 1 as stated in proposition 7; qualitatively it is similar to figure 3.
We recall the date 2 problem with the multiple: it gave a very good chance for a payment M 2 N 2 in exchange for an investment of N 2 ; the negative company stake was necessary to ensure a fair contract. Here something similar happens. For illustration, we focus on the situation where N 1 = N 2 close to zero as well as P 1 = P 2 = P 3 , and ignore any distribution. Then, if N 1 is small (close to 0), N 2 will also be small, the multiple will pay in full and contribute M 1 N 1 to the value of the first VC's stake; to price this fairly at N 1 the value needs to be decreased using the participation; hence the stake should be negative if M 1 > 1. As before at date 2 the remedy to this is to reduce the multiple.
In addition, proposition 7 the company will be liquidated when new money raised gets too large despite positive pre-money value (destructive liquidation). To provide intuition for this, we focus on the situation where N 1 , P 2 and P 3 are close to P 1 . Then, at date 2, if the company is liquidated, the liquidation value λP 1 is small compared to N 1 and will pay only a small amount; if the company is financed (not liquidated) at date 2, then the senior liquidation preference attributes any remaining value P 3 to the second VC's multiple M 2 N 2 and virtually nothing to the first VC. Taking account of the distribution of values, we note that, on top, the first VC still has a (small) chance of a payout from participation; a large payout from the participation is then needed so that the date 1 value equals the invested money N 1 , i.e. α 1 needs to get large.
Our results imply that the VC does not have the freedom to invest any amount of new money N 1 . If N 1 is too small and M too large, then α 1 is less than than 0%; but in this situation a smaller multiple (M = 1) will always work. If N 1 is large, but still smaller than P 1 we may not be able to contract at all; this is surprising as there is a positive pre-money value P 1 − N 1 , i.e. after subtracting new money coming in there is a positive value to the company but it will still be liquidated, because the first VC has no chance of recovering her initial investment.
The First VC's Date 1 Stake With Full Ratchet
This subsection assumes the first VC holds a full ratchet (anti-dilution protection). When the ratchet does not apply or is waived, her stake is adjusted to α a 1 = α 1 (1 − α 2 ) as in the case without ratchet; otherwise it is adjusted to α a 1 = N 1 /N 2 α 2 , see equation (3) of subsection 2.2. The first VC anticipates this when setting her date 1 stake in the venture; we will now analyze how she contracts.
In the previous subsection we only had to distinguish between two date 2 events: liquidation versus financing. In addition we need to distinguish here if the ratchet applies or not when the company is financed. For this, we introduce the indicator variable I (fin, rat) which takes the value 1 when the company is financed and the ratchet applies; in all other cases it takes the value 0.
Similarly I (fin, no rat) takes the value 1 when the company is financed and the ratchet does not apply; in all other cases it takes the value 0. (The ratchet applies when the share price decreases and it is not waived. The ratchet does not apply either when the share price does not decrease or when it does but the ratchet is waived.) The indicator variables I liq and I fin remain as in the previous subsection. Note that for a company that is financed the ratchet either applies or not, so that I (fin, rat) + I (fin, no rat) = I fin .
Based on our analysis in subsection 4.1 we then determine the date 1 value of the first VC's investment as a function of the stake α 1 :
Fair contracting requires N 1 = V 1 (α 1 ), which gives
In the event that the ratchet applies at date 2, the stake α 1 that the first VC contracts at date 1 does not impact the payout from participation: it is then α a 1 = N 1 /N 2 α 2 . Therefore it will not determine what the VC needs to recover from participation. This is exactly what the denominator in equations (8, 9) gives us: it is conditioned on the joint event that the company is financed and that the ratchet does not apply. the term on the right-hand side in equation (8) is positive (negative) for small financings. The term in equation (9) captures the impact of the full ratchet and always makes a positive contribution to the stake so that, overall, for M 1 larger than
the stake is negative. We expect that only for multiples M 1 up to a value smaller than
the stake is positive for small financings; however there is no expression to this. Other than that, proposition 8 is similar to proposition 7 and has similar interpretations. Table 1 provides a summary of the literature on VC characteristics of new ventures. Peng (2001) does not report risk-parameters from which the volatility σ P could be inferred; Quigley and Woodward (2003) are the only ones that provide pre-and post-money values from which the fraction of new money N can be inferred. Given that venture capital is a high risk environment where many ventures fail, the standard deviation reported by Quigley and Woodward (2003) strikes us as surprisingly low in comparison to broad stock market indexes, e.g. to the S&P500; therefore we adopt the value reported by Cochrane (2005) . To our knowledge the literature has not studied the volatility of new moneys raised and the correlation with post-money values;
Numerical Examples
we take the volatility of new money raised equal to that of the post-money value; a successful venture increases in value and requires new financing, so that we expect post-money value and new money raised to be positively correlated and simply take the correlation equal one-half.
Furthermore we adopt a value of λ = 0.1 for fractional recovery of initial post-money value.
Overall, our baseline parameters throughout this section are T = 5; N 1 = 0.27; σ P = σ N = 0.89; κ P N = 0.5; r = 5%; λ = 0.1. M 2 P 2 = 0.25 P 2 = 0.5 P 2 = 0.75 P 2 = 1 P 2 = 1.25 P 2 = 1.5 P 2 = 1.75 P 2 = 2.0 Table 2 uses baseline parameters and presents for different choices of date 2 post-money value P 2 the multiple cutoff (Panel A), the destructive liquidation cutoff (Panel B) and how far that cutoff is from the post-money value, i.e. the difference P 2 −N l 2 (Panel C). Each panel looks at date 2 post-money values P 2 ranging from 1/4 to 2; rows one to 3 look separately at multiples 1 to 3.
The Second VC's Investment Problem
For M 2 = 1 there is no multiple cutoff in Panel A because the stake is always non-negative.
For M 2 = 2, 3, whatever the value P 2 , the cutoff is always strictly positive and increases as we increase P 2 ; also, the cutoff increases as we increase M 2 from 2 to 3. Note that the cutoff is sizeable; e.g. for P 2 = 1 it is 0.399 (0.589) for multiples M 2 = 2 (M 2 = 3). We do not report the numbers here, but an easy calculation based on Panel A shows that, the quotient of multiple cutoff to post-money value P 2 is fairly constant, quantitatively, but that the multiple impacts results considerably. Table 3 : Date 1 multiple (reduction) and (destructive) liquidation cutoffs without ratchet and with full ratchet.
We see in Panel B that the liquidation cutoff is a sizeable number that will likely affect the second VC's contracting. Furthermore, as P 2 or the multiple increases, the cutoff increases; with respect to the multiple this result is in line with proposition 3. Surprisingly, the cutoff does not change much for fixed P 2 as we increase the multiple. Similarly, we see in Panel C that the difference between the post-money value and the cutoff value does not change much as we increase the post-money value or the multiple. (It seems to decrease (increase) slightly as we increase the multiple (the post-money value).) This means that relative to post-money value destructive liquidation gets more and more relevant, in line with proposition 4. Table 3 presents the date 1 multiple (reduction) and (destructive) liquidation cutoffs; we distinguish "no ratchet" from "(full) ratchet." When the multiple M 1 = 1 we calculate that it never has to be reduced. As we increase the multiple, there is a cutoff for multiple reduction and it increases with the multiple. Comparing the cutoff for multiple reduction without ratchet and the one with (full) ratchet we see that the latter is always larger. Intuitively this makes sense: for the same stake the date 1 value of the first VC is always larger with than without ratchet; under fair contracting, the participation needs to compensate this with an even larger negative stake; consequently the multiple needs to be reduced with ratchet in more situations than without ratchet. Table 3 suggests that there is (almost) no impact on the (destructive) liquidation cutoffs whether the first VC has or does not have a ratchet: for the same multiple the numbers without ratchet and with full ratchet are the same. Getting back to our discussion in subsection 3.4, in particular to figure 5, we recall that, for any date 2 post-money value P 2 , varying the amount N 2 both dilution and ratchet waiver are directly below destructive liquidation. This means that when new money raised is so large that the company will be liquidated despite having positive pre-money value, then for slightly smaller financings there is dilution but the ratchet will be waived. So, it does not make a big difference if the VC has a ratchet or not.
The First VC's Investment Problem
As we increase the multiple, it appears in table 3 that the liquidation cutoff decreases. It is surprising, however, that the liquidation cutoff does not depend quantitatively much on the multiple.
Finally it is important to note the size of the cutoffs. The liquidation cutoffs are roughly at two-third, which means that even if pre-money value is roughly one-third of post-money value, the venture will not be financed. The multiple reduction cutoffs can also be fairly large; with a multiple of M = 3 and full ratchet its is approximately 20%. Overall, with some contracting constellations (large multiple, full ratchet) the interval in which VCs can contract can become fairly small.
In subsection 3.4 we noted that four date 2 events are relevant for the first VC: multiple reduction, destructive liquidation, dilution and ratchet waiver. (These events may occur jointly.)
In subsection 3.4 we studied in figures 4 and 5 the date 2 combinations of post-money value with new money and presented the areas in which the mentioned events occur. Here we are interested in date 1 and want to assess the (joint) probability of the four events. The assessment depends on the company stake contracted at date 1; we use the date 1 fair contract of subsection 4.2 (without ratchet) and 4.3 (full ratchet) for the first VC for baseline paramters Table 4 presents in Panel A the date 1 probabilities of the four date 2 events and in Panel B the probability of multiple reduction joint together with liquidation, share price decrease and ratchet waiver, respectively. We distinguish three different multiples M 1 = 1, 2, 3 (rows one to three in both tables). When the multiple is one, we calculate that the multiple does not have to be reduced.
Each of the probabilities in Panel A of Table 4 : Date 1 probabilities of events joint with multiple reduction; based on date 1 fair contract for first VC.
sensitivity varies: the increase is very strong for the event "multiple reduction" and any joint events with this but basically does not depend on the event "liquidation."
Note that the probabilities are sizeable: the probability that the company is liquidated is about 1/4; the probability that the multiple is reduced goes to more than 70% with a multiple of 3. The probabilities that relate to the ratchet are also of considerable size: the probability that the share price decreases is in the range 35% to 45%, and that the ratchet is waived is about 18%.
Furthermore, in Panel B, the events "multiple reduction" and "liquidation" intersect partially, but only on a small set of conditional date 2 events with small probability; with a multiple of M = 3 this is less than 6%; therefore the sum of the probabilities of both events indicates that, with a multiple of 3, the probability is about 90% that the multiple will have to be reduced or the company liquidated. Finally, we calculate based on Panels A and B that the conditional probability that the ratchet is waived if the share price decreases is 40% to 50%. Furthermore, note that even when the multiple is reduced the joint probability of a share price decrease is 
Comparative Statics of the First VC's Stake
The previous subsections studied qualitatively and quantitatively when the multiple is reduced and when there is destructive liquidation. This subsection carries out comparative statics of the first VC's stake with respect to the input parameters. Table 5 Some observations can made for all choices. First, as we increase the multiple, the stake decreases. Second, the company stake with full ratchet is always lower than without ratchet.
(These two observations have been noted before and come at no surprise.)
The sign of the sensitivity varies. It is positive for time remaining to liquidation (T ), new money required (N 1 ), post-money risk (σ P ) and correlation between post-money risk and new money required (κ P N ), but negative for the risk of new money required over time (σ N ). This is as expected from the literature on call options and spread options: the option value of the multiple contributes most to the claim value and increases, e.g. with time T ; only the remainder needs to be made up by the participation which comes from the company stake and, therefore, decreases as we increase time T .
In general, the sensitivity to changes in the parameters is fairly small when the multiple is one. (The exception here is new money N 1 which almost doubles as we go from −15% of the baseline value for N 1 to +15%.) The sensitivity increases (remains almost unchanged) for T, N 1 , σ P (σ N , κ P N ) as we increase the multiple.
Interestingly, overall, the difference between no ratchet and full ratchet is not very large;
with a multiple of one it is about 10% and even with a multiple of three it is typically less than 20%. (The exception here is the situation where σ P is reduced by 15%). Furthermore, some of the parameter choices do not appear very critical: varying σ N and κ P N does not impact much the company stake. This is good news as these parameters have not been studied directly in the literature and we could only infer rough estimates of them in subsection 2.3. The parameter choices time T , new money N 1 and log post-money standard deviation, however, are either known (N 1 ) or we have previously been studied in the literature. This implies that remaining time to IPO, new money raised and post-money risk are critical model parameters, quantitatively, while risk (volatility) of new money raised and correlation are less important.
Conclusion
This paper introduced a model of venture capital, in which the post-money value and new money raised are random and two VCs could provide staged financing at different dates. We determined their zero net present-value stakes, analyzed their optimal investment policies over time both qualitatively and quantitatively, and discussed the resulting financings constraints.
Note that an option always has positive value,
this implies that, as N 1 tends to zero, α 2 will take negative values; however, if M 2 < exp(rT /2) it will be positive.
If M 2 = exp(rT /2) we use the probabilistic representation of the Black-Scholes value, i.e.
BS(P
e.g. Duffie (2001) . The positive part defines a convex function and so Jensen's inequality implies that this is larger than
Together with equation (6) this
Next we prove the stated monotonicity properties. The denominator of α 2 in equation (6) is strictly decreasing in N 2 and therefore its inverse is strictly increasing. For further analysis we define the numerator of α 2 in equation (6) as a function f (N 2 ) = N 2 − P 2 + BS(P 2 , M 2 , N 2 ). The first and second derivative of this function are
The sign of the first derivative near 0 has been determined above in this proof: it is positive (negative) if M 2 is smaller (larger) than exp(rT /2). The second derivative is always positive.
This implies that with increasing N 2 , the function f is decreasing initially and then increasing.
Because the inverse of the denominator is strictly increasing this implies the stated monotonicity of α 2 .
It remains to study the stake α 2 when N 2 is close to P 2 . We rewrite equation (6) as
The sign of the numerator then determines whether α 2 (P 2 , N 2 ) is larger or smaller than one.
, the numerator is strictly positive and we have α 2 (P 2 , N 2 ) ≥ 1 for N 2 ≥ P 2 . Note that the function α 2 (P 2 , N 2 ) is continuous in N 2 ; we showed above that for N 2 = 0, α 2 (P 2 , N 2 ) = 0. Therefore, it will be larger than one on some interval before P 2 and there is a cutoff for N 2 beyond which the stake is larger than 100%.
Proof of proposition 3. Taking derivatives of the stake α 2 in equation (6) shows:
Using equation (10) we find:
The second term can be expressed using the stake α 2 , see equation (6). Under our assumption < 0, which in turn implies
Proof of proposition 4. A first-order approximation of the Black-Scholes formula around strike 0 gives
If M 2 < exp(rT /2), this implies existence ofγ such that γ −1+BS (1, M 2 γ) > 0 for all 0 < γ <γ.
In the following we assume γ with this property. It is well known that numeraire invariance of the Black-Scholes formula implies
As P 2 tends to zero, M 1 N 1 /P 2 tends to infinity and so the denominator tends to zero. Because the numerator is strictly positive, α 2 (P 2 , γP 2 ) tends to plus infinity. This implies the existence ofP 2 with the stated property.
If M 2 < exp(rT /2), we proceed similarly: then existsγ such that γ − 1 + BS (1, M 2 γ) < 0 for all 0 < γ <γ; so, the numerator in equation (12) is negative, α 2 (P 2 , γP 2 ) tends to minus infinity and there existsP 2 with the stated property.
Proof of proposition 5. First, we study the statement about dilution and existence of the cutoff. We recall that the share price is diluted, if p 2 < p 1 , where the date 1 share price is p 1 = N 1 /S 1 and the date 2 share price is given by equation (1). Because
For further analysis we define f (N 2 ) = (N 2 − P 2 + BS(P 2 , M 2 N 2 ))/N 2 and calculate
We have that the numerator
This implies that f is strictly increasing in N 2 . Because BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 ) is strictly decreasing in N 2 , we find that
is strictly decreasing in N 2 . Obviously, −N 2 is strictly decreasing as we increase N 2 . We conclude that the right-hand side in equation (13) 
Because α 2 ≤ 1 and
∂BS ∂K
is negative this is larger than
Equation (10) describes
; using this representation and
The difference in brackets on the right-hand side is strictly positive because d 2 is decreasing in the strike. This implies the statement.
Proof of proposition 6. If the share price decreases, the ratchet is waived when 1 < α 2 +α a 2
where α a 2 is given in equation (3); this happens if
i.e. if N 2 gets sufficiently large. Proposition 3 states that ∂α 2 ∂M 2 < 0; this means that if we increase M 2 we need to decrease N 2 to get to the same level on the left-hand side in equation (15) and soN w 2 must decrease. Proof of proposition 7. Using equation (6) together with equation (7) we rewrite the first VC's stake as
This will be used throughout this proof.
First we study the statement about the multiple cutoff and new financings N 1 close to zero.
A series expansion gives 
Finally, we note that As N 1 tends to 0, the denominator tends to P 1 = 1. We can therefore write this using the numerator as 
This tends to zero as N 1 tends to zero; asymptotically we see negative stakes α 1 if
.
However, if this M 1 is smaller than the right-hand side, then stakes α 1 are positive near 0.
We now study the first VC's stake for new financings N 1 close to P 1 . Using equation (16) continuous function in N 1 it will be larger than zero also for some interval of N 1 before P 1 and consequently on that interval α 1 (P 1 , N 1 ) > 1. This proves the statement about the liquidation cutoff.
Proof of proposition 8. First, we study the first VC's stake with full ratchet for N 1 close to zero. Using equation (6) we get
T 2 E {BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 ) − BS(P 2 , M 2 N 2 ) + P 2 − N 2 }I (fin, no rat) . When the company is financed, it must be that N 2 < P 2 ; then BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 ) − BS(P 2 , M 2 N 2 ) > 0 and so also BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 ) − BS(P 2 , M 2 N 2 ) + P 2 − N 2 > 0. The probability of the joint event that the company is not liquidated and the ratchet does not apply is positive. This implies that the denominator in both fractions is strictly positive. Next we note that α 2 ≥ 0 when the second VC contracts. Therefore, the numerator in the second fraction and therefore the entire fraction is positive. Finally, we noted also in the proof of proposition 7 that the numerator N 1 − e −r T 2 E L VC (P 2 , N 2 )I liq + {BS(P 2 , M 2 N 2 ) − BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 + M 2 N 2 )}I fin in the first fraction gets negative for N 1 close to 0, when M 1 > exp(−rT /2)/Prob [financing] . The contribution from the second fraction is always negative; overall, we can then conclude that α 1 gets negative for N 1 close to 0, if
Finally, it remains to study the limiting behavior of α 1 for N 1 near P 1 . Using equation (6) we get .
As before, the denominator in both fractions is strictly positive. Therefore α 1 > 1 when the sum of the numerators in the two fractions is positive.
We make use of α a 1 = N 1 /N 2 α 2 , see equation (3), and note that α a 1 +α 2 must be less than 100%; otherwise the ratchet will have to be waived. Therefore, α a 1 ≤ 1 − α 2 ; Using equation (6) we then find that −(α a 1 −1)BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 +M 2 N 2 ) ≥ α 2 BS(P 2 , M 1 N 1 +M 2 N 2 ) = N 2 −P 2 +BS(P 2 , M 2 N 2 ). 
This implies

−E {BS(P
